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List of Abbreviations
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Background
Recent acts of international terrorism, the increased frequency of extreme
weather events and newly emerging health threats highlight the need to develop
effective emergency response plans and capabilities for responding to all types of
disasters. Many countries recognize the importance to consider emergency
preparedness as the key health planning activity. Since the September 11th, 2001
terrorist attacks, and the devastation of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, the United States
have extensively reinforced hospital disaster preparedness and response.
Although since the major disasters, hospitals have implemented and
continuously tested their emergency operation plans, recent studies reported
existing confusion over roles and responsibilities, poor communication, lack of
planning, suboptimal training, and a lack of hospital integration into community
disaster planning. Therefore, it is important that further studies are conducted in
order to capitalize on lessons learned from previous real-incidents and emergency
response exercises.
Many hospitals conduct exercises every year, and they conclude the process
with an After-Action Report and Improvement Plan. Therefore, there are thousands
of AAR/IP’s across the country with limited opportunity to compare them or to learn
from them collectively. Our project has gathered Improvement Plans (IP’s) and
conducted a qualitative analysis which determined whether the “lessons learned” can
be categorized into common themes.
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Introduction
Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, anthrax attacks, Hurricane
Katrina of August 2005, and the flu vaccine shortage of 2004-2005, the United States
(US) has considerably strengthened its public health emergency preparedness
(PHEP) (Seid et al., 2007). To effectively respond to the dramatic increase in the
frequency and intensity of natural disasters (Yu, Zhong, Pei, Bian, & Heilman, 2016),
infectious disease, technological, and human-caused disasters, multiple resources
were allocated and directed to enhance U.S. public health system and address gaps in
emergency preparedness operations (Der-Martirosian et al., 2017). However, the
experience of the 2017 Hurricane Harvey showed that disasters continue to cause
loss of human life, environmental damage, disruption of infrastructure, and economic
loss. At the same time, terrorists are using new technologies and militarized tactics to
cause maximum terror among unprotected civilians (Bobko et al., 2018). Therefore,
concerns remain about the ability of the public health system to promptly and
effectively respond to disasters (Seid et al., 2007). Studies of previous disasters have
documented that hospitals located in disaster areas are not well prepared and most
of the time experience poor emergency response performance due to functional
collapse (Nekoie-Moghadam et al., 2016). Preparing hospitals for disasters has
become a national security priority (Toner, 2017). Therefore, hospitals should
implement actions, programs, and systems that improve their capabilities and
capacities to provide essential healthcare while minimizing the negative effects of the
disaster (Djalali et al., 2014).
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As an important component of the public health preparedness system,
hospitals require a continuous process of planning and exercising while measuring
performance through indicators and metrics, and implementing and testing
improvements (Jenkins, Kelen, Sauer, Fredericksen, & McCarthy, 2009; Shine, Hill,
Pope, & Altevogt, 2008). Hospital surge capacity is based on the hospital’s ability to
meet a sudden and unusual spike in demand for resources (Waxman et al., 2017).
Maintaining high-level emergency preparedness for hospitals is challenging as the
process requires resources that many hospitals may lack (Adini, Laor, Hornik-Lurie,
Schwartz, & Aharonson-Daniel, 2012). A multitude of intractable disasters tests the
ability of hospitals to effectively manage emergencies situations. Confusion over roles
and responsibilities, poor communication, lack of planning, suboptimal training, and
lack of hospital integration into community disaster planning can lead to poor
readiness (Nekoie-Moghadam et al., 2016). There is a significant urgent need for
reliable and valid methods to measure hospital preparedness capabilities in order to
ensure their resiliency, continuity, and rapid recovery (Der-Martirosian et al., 2017).
Valid and standardized assessment tools are required to evaluate the correlation
between the level of preparedness and the efficacy of response performance (Djalali
et al., 2014).
Effective management of disaster operations will improve readiness, decrease
response time, and facilitate recovery (Altay & Green III, 2006). Planning and training
for disasters will reduce both human and property loss, and improve the rapid
recovery from the disaster (Singleton, DeBastiani, Rose, & Kahn, 2014). However,
planning and training might not be sufficient if valuable lessons learned from
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disasters and exercises are not used to anticipate response challenges (der Heide,
2006). The World Association of Disaster Medicine has highlighted the need for a
more scientific approach to all aspects of disaster medicine and has noted the lack of
standardized methods to assess mass casualty incident responses (Ingrassia et al.,
2010). In the United States, the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) has evolved in
developing core capabilities to support hospital emergency readiness (Morris, 2016;
Toner, 2017; Waxman et al., 2017).
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), which has existed since the
Cold War, is designated as the primary federal response mechanism for mass casualty
situations (Toner, 2017). Originally designed to respond to large numbers of military
casualties from foreign battlefields, the NDMS’s mission has evolved toward civilian
medical support (Franco, Toner, Waldhorn, Inglesby, & O'Toole, 2007). Due to
increasingly frequent terrorist activities, the Metropolitan Medical Response
Program (MMRP) was created at the Health and Human Services (HHS) (Toner,
2017). The MMRP was eventually transferred to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) until the program became defunded in 2011 (Toner, 2017; Waxman
et al., 2017). At the Hospital level, much stricter Joint Commission standards for
emergency preparedness were released in early 2001(Morris, 2016). But the
September 2001 terrorist attacks led to major transformation regarding the Joint
Commission standards due to the creation of the Office of Public Health Preparedness
(Toner, 2017).
The new office created the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness
Program (NBHPP) whose mission was to prepare the country’s 5,000 hospitals for
6

expected bio-attacks (Franco et al., 2007). In 2006, the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) was signed, replacing the Office of Public Health
Preparedness with the new Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response (ASPR) (Morris, 2016; Toner, 2017). After the creation of ASPR, the NBHPP
was changed to the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP), whose mission involves
all-hazard healthcare preparedness (Toner, 2017). The HPP has continued to evolve
and has increasingly focused on the development of healthcare coalitions (HCC)
designed to increase emergency preparedness collaboration among hospitals and
between hospitals and public health agencies, emergency management agencies, and
emergency medical services (Toner, 2017). In parallel with the HPP, in 2002, the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) launched the Public Health
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative agreement to effectively prepare
territorial, tribal, local, and state public health departments (Toner, 2017). On the
other hand, the Joint Commission has continued to evolve by ensuring that health
professions are committed to a high quality of patient care.
The frequency and magnitude of medical errors and deadly disaster in the US
have increased awareness about the need for effective medical processes and
emergency preparedness responses (Devkaran & O’Farrell, 2015). Therefore, the
Joint Commission has developed Emergency Management (EM) processes to allow
hospitals to plan to respond to the effects of potential emergency events that could
disrupt normal healthcare capabilities (Joint Commission, 2014). To effectively
respond to an emergency, the JCAH has developed six critical areas that hospitals can
consider to address a range of incidents (Joint Commission, 2014).
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Although numerous planners and responders have documented lessons
learned during emergency responses (Djalali et al., 2014), the review of the literature
highlighted that many challenges experienced during planning and real-events seem
to repeat themselves disaster after disaster (der Heide, 2006). There is a lack of
standards for defining and measuring preparedness, and for effectively incorporating
lessons learned from past experience and implementing systematic changes (NekoieMoghadam et al., 2016; Seid et al., 2007). Whether from real events or simulations,
public health and healthcare organizations recognized the need to use a lessonslearned approach to identify and disseminate the experience gained over time
(Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). It is important that lessons learned are
transferred from individuals directly involved in emergency operations to systematic
changes within the entire organization (Seid et al., 2007). An objective method for
assessment should determine strengths and weaknesses in the disaster response and
provide information that could ultimately lead to improvements in the response
system (Ingrassia et al., 2010). Systematically collected data from disasters or
fictional exercises might help emergency planners to avoid common disaster
response pitfalls (der Heide, 2006). Therefore, it is useful for emergency
preparedness planners to implement formal tools for identifying, documenting and
disseminating corrective actions before a response to disasters and simulations.
After-Action Reports (ARRs)/Improvement Plan (IP) guidelines are designed
to document the exercise planning, execution, and analysis that have become the
implementation requirements for the Department of Homeland Security’ State
Homeland Security Grant Program, the Department of Health and Human Services,

8

the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s Public Health Emergency
Preparedness Grant Program, and the Urban Area Security Initiative (Singleton et al.,
2014). The use of AAR templates became strongly recommended in several federal
funding agencies’ capability and exercise guidance. Therefore, the Homeland Security
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR/IP template is considered the
primary tool of the National Exercise Program materials and improvement process
(Norige, Yenson, Elkin, Mapar, & Legary, 2012; Singleton et al., 2014).
The HSEEP provides a set of guidelines and principles for exercise programs
to effectively manage preparedness simulations, design and develops exercises,
evaluate outcomes, and improve planning (Norige et al., 2012). The Joint Commission
requires healthcare institutions to conduct and maintain emergency operations plan,
and to conduct exercises and drills at least twice a year (Ferrer, Ramirez, Sauser,
Iverson, & Upperman, 2009). Exercises and drills are key components of national
preparedness as they provide the opportunity to shape planning, assess and validate
capabilities, and address areas for improvement (Norige et al., 2012). Preparedness
exercises play a vital role in national preparedness by allowing whole community
stakeholders to test and validate plans and capabilities. Exercises enable the
identification of both capability gaps and areas for improvement in order to
strengthen whole community efforts to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to,
and recover from all disasters (Norige et al., 2012). The National Exercise Program
(NEP) is consistent with the HSEEP methodology because in that it provides tools and
guidelines that are flexible, scalable, and adaptable to all mission areas (such as
prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery) (Norige et al., 2012). The
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HSEEP methodology is based on an exercise cycle which involves design and
development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning (Norige et al., 2012).
Immediately after the conduct of the exercises, a “hot wash” session provides an
opportunity to discuss strengths and areas for improvement (Norige et al., 2012).
Information collected during Hot Wash, the debriefing, and completed participant
feedback forms can be used to generate the AAR/IP to ensure future exercise
improvements (Norige et al., 2012).
The HSEEP developed the After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
to provide a template and guidance to evaluate exercise objectives and capabilities
(Norige et al., 2012). Preparedness exercises test the knowledge, skills, and abilities
that are likely to be needed during emergency situations (Ingrassia et al., 2010).
AAR/IP is used to document strengths, areas for improvement, core capability
performance, and corrective actions (Norige et al., 2012). They summarize key
information related to the evaluation of the exercises and their length, format, and
development timeframe depend on the exercise type and scope. AARs are emergency
preparedness tools for collecting and documenting evaluations of key processes
during the response to both simulations and real emergency situations (Savoia et al.,
2012). The HSEEP AAR/IP templates are the standards for reporting preparedness
exercises, real incidents, and continuous quality improvement across various federal
agencies on disaster management (Singleton et al., 2014). AARs are routinely
generated after drills or exercises to assess improvements (Seid et al., 2007). In fact,
formal AARs are now required by public health and healthcare agencies and
organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the
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Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), and the Joint Commission
(Morris, 2016; Savoia et al., 2012; Waxman et al., 2017). The AAR templates are
intended to assist in identifying lessons learned from disaster preparedness exercises
in order to facilitate the quality improvement of the response process (Norige et al.,
2012; Singleton et al., 2014). They contain basic information, such as the exercise
name, the type of exercise, dates, location, participating organizations, mission areas,
specific threat or hazard, a brief scenario description, and the name of the exercise
sponsor (Mast et al., 2016; Norige et al., 2012).
The main focus of the AARs is the analysis of core capabilities which involves
the collection of sufficient relevant data to support effective evaluation and
improvement planning (Mast et al., 2016; Norige et al., 2012). Hospital emergency
preparedness planning is done based on core capabilities that are listed in the HPP
(Toner, 2017). The AARs should provide an overview of performance related to each
exercise objective and associated core capability while highlighting strengths, as well
as areas for improvement (Norige et al., 2012). Areas for improvement requiring
corrective actions are those that will continue to seriously impede capability
performance if left unresolved. It is important to provide useful information as to how
quality improvement aspects are built into AARs to better implement corrective
actions. After the identification of strengths and areas for improvement that directly
addresses core capability gaps, improvement planning should be done to implement
concrete corrective actions (Norige et al., 2012).
Improvement planning is the final phase of the preparedness exercise as it
involves the qualitative assessment of actionable recommendations that are intended
11

to resolve capability gaps and issues identified during the exercises or real-world
disasters (Norige et al., 2012). Corrective actions documented in the AAR/IP should
be monitored and continually reported until fully completed (Norige et al., 2012).
However, most of the time lessons learned embodied in AARs are not acted on and sit
on shelves due to unclear expectations and measures (Seid et al., 2007).
Hospitals play a major role in emergency response because a disaster can
create medical needs that are beyond their normal capabilities. They are an important
link in the chain of disaster response (Nekoie-Moghadam et al., 2016). There is a need
to improve hospital preparedness that addresses a full range of potential disasters
(Jenkins et al., 2009). Achieving and maintaining a high level of emergency
preparedness is very challenging for hospitals because of the complex role they play
during disaster response (Der-Martirosian et al., 2017). It is equally challenging to
evaluate hospital emergency readiness to effectively respond during disasters (DerMartirosian et al., 2017). Evaluation and reporting tools should be included in
hospital disaster plans in order to recognize potential gaps and weaknesses (NekoieMoghadam et al., 2016). AARs in hospitals are a fundamental part of emergency
preparedness and quality improvement (Brunner et al., 2014). For instance, during
the April 2013 Boston Marathon attack, the Brigham and Women's Hospital (BWH)
called for a substantial volume of radiological imaging, taxing their capacity to
perform such studies (Tobert, von Keudell, & Rodriguez, 2015). Due to the severity of
physical injuries, the BWH AAR revealed that greater use of computerized
tomography (CT) scans should have been anticipated in the disaster planning
(Brunner et al., 2014). Another example included a tabletop exercise that
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acknowledged that adult patient hospitals are lacking pediatric supply caches (Ferrer
et al., 2009). Other important ethical issues were raised regarding whether or not
adult general surgeons were allowed to operate on pediatric patients during
emergency situations (Ferrer et al., 2009).
Statement of the Problem
In recent years, communities throughout the United States and other countries
have experienced large-scale disasters that challenged the capacity of response
(Ferrer et al., 2009). Despite multiple attempts to document and learn from previous
emergency responses and scenario-based exercises, the challenges experienced in
planning and responding to disasters seem to be persistent (der Heide, 2006; Savoia
et al., 2012). Improvement areas keep repeating themselves in AARs because
corrective actions are not implemented due to unclear expectations and measures.
Lessons learned embodied in the improvement matrix are not acted on and sit on
shelves due to unclear expectations and measures (Seid et al., 2007). For instance,
although many hospital’s improvement areas keep mentioning the need for effective
communication, poor communication systems remain a common concern in disaster
preparedness efforts (Ferrer et al., 2009). Systems-level learning remains challenging
to accomplish, therefore, review of incidents and the identification of lessons should
be more readily performed (Savoia et al., 2012). Nationally aggregated pools of AARs
should be used to collect the most common response challenges that hospitals are
experiencing routinely and proven problematic (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012).
Accordingly, emergency preparedness and response planners can use data collected
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when drafting their training programs, so that the challenges could be included, and
hopefully not occur again.
This project will endeavor to perform a qualitative review of hospital AARs in
order to catalog the most common corrective actions identified during real-incidents
or simulations. The project also strives to identify the link between the improvement
efforts and the core capabilities to maximize knowledge management and quality
improvement practices. With our results, we will attempt to identify most common
improvement efforts which can be translated into concrete actions to be incorporated
into the design of future emergency preparedness planning and training.
Significance of study
Preparing hospitals for disasters has become a national security priority
because the US has experienced large-scale emergencies that caused the death of
large numbers of people (Toner, 2017). Despite a large amount of approximately
$300 million spent yearly in hospital emergency preparedness program (Lindsay,
2017), hospital’s preparedness improvement areas continue to repeatedly document
common pitfalls in their AARs (Waxman et al., 2017). It is important that educational
and training programs focus on common concerns in disaster preparedness efforts as
well as challenges that were experienced during actual disaster responses. Thus,
funding could be directed to assist in solving the common problems which may save
lives and money or at least generate a better return on investment in the long term.
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i. Purpose of the study
1. Research question
What are the most common areas for improvements identified during
preparedness exercises or real disaster responses, as reported by a national sample
of U.S. hospitals?
2. Specific Aims
To identify common themes in a sample of Improvement Matrices from US
hospitals in order to categorize the correctives actions.
3. Definitions of terms
We believed that it is important to define certain terms used in our study to
ensure common understanding. Therefore, we have attempted to define the following
terms:
-

The term “code” is often considered to be a system of words, letters,
figures, or other symbols substituted for other word, letters, etc., especially
for the purpose of secrecy. In our study the term “code” refers to an
analytical process in which data are categorized to facilitate analysis;

-

The term "segment" is often associated with parts into which something is
or may be divided. Our study has associated "segment" to a portion of
statement that has been coded;

-

The terms “elements of performance” generally mean work assignments
or responsibilities that are used to plan, monitor, and appraise
performance. Our study has used the terms “elements of performance” to
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categorize the components of the critical areas by which hospital
emergency response capabilities can be planned, monitored, and rated;
-

The verb “extrapolate” refers to the extension of an application to an
unknown situation by assuming that existing trends will continue, or
similar methods will be applicable. Our study has used the verb
"extrapolate" to link coded segment to its assumed corresponding
elements of a performance.
4. Assumptions

The major assumption of the study considered that hospital emergency
response readiness does not depend on the size of the hospital. Therefore, the size of
hospitals was not controlled during the analysis. Another assumption was made that
the sample was a representative of the full scope of threats as data were randomly
collected.
2. Literature Review
The increasing human and economic impact of disasters, the globalization of the
terrorist activities, and the declaration of the 1990s as the International Decade of
Natural Disaster Reduction are among the reasons for the rise in interest in
emergency management (Altay & Green III, 2006). Healthcare systems should
prepare effective emergency response models to cope with mass-casualty incidents
(Adini et al., 2006). Disaster management involves two stages; pre-event and postevent. Pre-event efforts include predicting and analyzing potential risks and
developing strategies for mitigation, while post-event tasks begin during the
emergency (Altay & Green III, 2006. Since 2002, the need for pre-event preparedness
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has been reinforced by the HSEEP and underlying issues or root causes should be
uncovered to develop corrective and actionable solutions to improvement areas
(Singleton et al., 2014). Effective emergency management efforts should involve both
pre-event and post-event data to locate, allocate, coordinate, and manage available
resources (Altay & Green III, 2006). For years, hospital emergency management
services have used various modes to collect and disseminate lessons-learned from
exercise or real emergency responses (Djalali et al., 2014; Savoia et al., 2012).
Specifically, over the past decade, numerous initiatives and preparedness tools have
been developed to help hospitals improve their ability to become better prepared for
major disasters (Der-Martirosian et al., 2017).
To date, there is limited agreement about indicators that constitute effective
hospital emergency preparedness (Adini et al., 2006; Ingrassia et al., 2010; NekoieMoghadam et al., 2016) and no largely-accepted, validated instruments to measure
readiness exist (Adini et al., 2006; Adini et al., 2012; Der-Martirosian et al., 2017;
McCarthy, Brewster, Hsu, Macintyre, & Kelen, 2009). Furthermore, there are a
number of differences in the protocols and tools that exist for evaluating hospital’s
emergency management capabilities (Jenkins et al., 2009; McCarthy et al., 2009;
Nekoie-Moghadam et al., 2016). The Hospital Safety Index (HSI) developed by the
World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the internationally-accepted and
standardized evaluation methods (Djalali et al., 2014). While a number of instruments
are hazard-specific, some tools are more comprehensive with the ability to be used to
measure hospital all-hazards preparedness (Der-Martirosian et al., 2017). Hospital
preparedness evaluations also may include drills and functional exercises to assess
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performance during a simulated mass-casualty emergency (MCE) (Ingrassia et al.,
2010). In the process of building resilient medical systems under the leadership of
the HHS Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF8), healthcare coalitions have been
established (Lowe, Hansen, Sanger, & Obaid, 2016). For instance, due to key
leadership gaps identified in a hospital decision-making capacity, community-wide
healthcare coalition-based exercises are being more and more commonly
recommended (Lowe et al., 2016). The aim of hospitals is to be prepared to effectively
respond to disasters and other potential disruptions to health care service delivery.
Based on the National Health Security Strategy (NHSS), the HPP core capabilities were
strengthened to improve hospital readiness (Rose, Murthy, Brooks, & Bryant, 2017).
In 2012, the National guidance established 10 HPP core capabilities aligned with the
15 PHEP capabilities (Lowe et al., 2016). Based on the 2012 national guidance, the
ASPR developed the 2017-2022 Health Care Preparedness and Response Capabilities
guidance which outlined four core capabilities (Veenema, 2018). One of the
conditions for hospitals to access federal grants is to fully engage themselves in
emergency preparedness operations (Barnes, 2017). In 1965, financial incentive
approach created by US government is the establishment of the ‘deemed status’ by
which any hospital accredited by the Joint Commission would be deemed to be
eligible for the Medicare program (Schyve, 2000). Medicare program represents a
large portion of the hospital income and that can contribute in financing emergency
preparedness programs.
The story of the Joint Commission started in 1910 and its development has
increased with technological progress in the practice of medicine to offer
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considerably safer care for patients (Roberts, Coale, & Redman, 1987). The Joint
Commission accredits over 20,000 ambulatory care, behavioral health care, home
care, long-term care organizations, hospitals, laboratories, and health care networks
(Roaten, Johnson, Genzel, Khan, & North, 2018). Over 96% of hospital beds in the US
are in accredited hospitals (Schyve, 2000). The Joint Commission created an Office of
Quality Monitoring to effectively handle quality-related issues (Schyve, 2000). To
specifically manage an emergency in hospitals, the Joint Commission introduced the
six critical areas: communication, resources and assets, safety and security, staff
responsibilities, patient clinical and support activities, and utilities (Joint
Commission, 2014). Hospitals are encouraged to consider their capabilities in these
critical areas in order to improve their emergency response efforts. Therefore,
hospitals have started using AARs to summarize lessons learned or recommendations
made to improve outcomes (Ross et al., 2008).
Although several disparate forms of debriefing methodologies were used, the
AARs were originally developed by the U.S. Army before becoming widely adopted by
non-military private institutions, and healthcare organizations (Savoia et al., 2012).
The Military AARs were used to provide feedback on the accomplishment of exercises,
deployments, or other military operations (Ross et al., 2008). Although the original
purpose of HSEEP AAR template was used to better identify and derive critical lessons
from preparedness exercises, it is also used to facilitate continuous quality
improvement for real disaster reporting (Singleton et al., 2014).
The use of the HSEEP AAR template by all public health services allowed
comparisons across jurisdictions for a better understanding of the range of
19

jurisdictional capabilities (Singleton et al., 2014). The HSEEP AAR guidelines provide
reporting equivalent measures by recommending the use of consistent standards that
can be applied to public health services. The HSEEP AAR format created a common
approach to exercise preparedness plans while evaluating improvement needs within
the emergency preparedness and response communities (Norige et al., 2012;
Singleton et al., 2014). Improvement planning involves tracking the implementation
of corrective actions to ensure tangible preparedness improvements (Norige et al.,
2012). The HSEEP AAR was developed to ensure that a sufficient level of detail
needed to improve preparedness capabilities are well reported (Singleton et al.,
2014). AARs provide a reservoir of vital information to prepare public health services
to effectively perform in a contingency environment (Ross et al., 2008). Yet, despite
the large dissemination of the ARRs, variability and variety of healthcare, and public
health systems may increase the risk of failure to fully implement the corrective
actions (Savoia et al., 2012).
One major challenge was the fact that most operational data collection on disaster
medical planning was done on sudden, single impact events such as explosions,
tornadoes, or flash floods, and in such conditions, the location of the research could
not be selected (der Heide, 2006). The unexpected nature of disasters obliged the data
to be collected retrospectively, which leads to challenges in the comparison of predisasters and post-disasters (der Heide, 2006). Previous literature reported various
challenges in the after-action reporting process regarding the involvement of
healthcare professionals as not everyone has the opportunity to be involved in the
after-action review (Ross et al., 2008). Traditionally, the written AAR did not provide
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an adequate feedback loop, therefore the alternative process involved the use of hot
wash meetings, online submissions, e-mail contributions, and verbal debriefings
(Ross et al., 2008).
As early as 1988, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) recognized that the public health
system is a complex network of individuals and institutions (Curry, 2005; Savoia et
al., 2012). The multiplicity of stakeholders involved in the emergency preparedness
management effort can be challenging to coordinate and that significantly impact the
type and quality of response efforts (Seid et al., 2007). In addition to the complexity
of the public health system, disaster preparedness is challenging due to the
uniqueness of events, the frequent changes of the environment, and the lack of
standardized processes (Seid et al., 2007). Therefore, it can be challenging for public
health services to work together to achieve the goal of keeping people secure and
healthy (Savoia et al., 2012). To avoid recurring challenges during emergency
response, it was important for health institutions to produce generalized
recommendations that can be useful in all types of disasters (Altay & Green III, 2006;
Savoia et al., 2012). The improvement effort involved the effective connection
between the observations of difficulties and the implementation of corrective actions
(Savoia et al., 2012; Seid et al., 2007).
The medical emergency planners should address the response problems
identified in descriptive disaster studies in order to assess the impact of
preparedness and response measures on morbidity and mortality (der Heide, 2006).
Therefore, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Homeland Security
Exercise Evaluation Program (HSEEP) requires organizations to link lessons learned
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to the planned implementation of improvement efforts (Savoia et al., 2012). AARs
were designed to accommodate both discussion-based and operations-based
exercises as reflected in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (Norige et al.,
2012; Singleton et al., 2014). For instance, during the 2009 Influenza (HINI) pandemic
response, all recipients of federal funds were required to use the HSEEP AAR template
and guidelines to document their emergency response (Singleton et al., 2014).
The HSEEP guidelines recommended that exercises and drills are performed to
test the improvements that are identified in AAR in response to the challenges (Savoia
et al., 2012). The AARs which are the final written documents of the after action
reviews will be used as quality improvement instruments (Singleton et al., 2014). In
addition, AARs data is updated to contain the most representative, recent, and most
common response difficulties (Savoia et al., 2012). It is important to implement
structures and rigorous information reviews of post-event in order to appropriately
make system-wide changes (Szoenyi, Venkateswaran, Keating, & MacClune, 2017).
For instance, lessons learned from December 2015, terrorist attack in Southern
California has considerably shown that there is a distinct difference between a
qualified Police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) paramedic and a paramedic
responding as part of the rescue task force (RTF)(Bobko et al., 2018). SWAT
paramedics are trained to operate in unsafe zones whereas the EMS personnel are
not most of the time trained to provide care under a direct threat (Bobko et al., 2018).
Confusion of operational objectives during an emergency response can impact the
performance of both Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and their law enforcement
partners (Bobko et al., 2018). During an emergency response, hospital staff may
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encounter challenges regarding altered standards of care (Ferrer et al., 2009).
Another example is that, after the 2014-2016 West Africa Ebola response, hospitals
in many countries used their AARs to identify gaps in operational interventions in the
US(Hurtado, Meyer, Snyder, & Nuzzo, 2018). Some studies suggested the use of
Quality Improvement (QI) methods to improve the performance and outcomes of
public health systems during emergency preparedness and response (Seid et al.,
2007).
QI involves an ongoing multidisciplinary, systems-focused, data-driven method of
understanding and improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and reliability of public
health practices and processes related to emergency preparedness (Seid et al., 2007;
Szoenyi et al., 2017). QI is a pervasive philosophy to ensure that information about
past performance should be used to improve the quality of response (Ross et al.,
2008). The preparedness process should involve building response capabilities
which involve informing, educating, and empowering people while setting goals and
measurements to evaluate performance (Seid et al., 2007). Public health
organizations should be accountable for implementing the QI methods to identify
corrective actions of the AARs (Seid et al., 2007). Since 2005, Root Cause Analysis
(RCA) has been an integral component of AARs for more effective analysis of
emergency preparedness issues (Singleton et al., 2014).
RCA is a qualitative, retrospective, quality improvement tool used to understand
the source of the problem down to the lowest level of the process (Percarpio, Watts,
& Weeks, 2008; Singleton et al., 2014; Woodward, 2004). During the after action
review, RCA is used to analyze identified issues in order to document successful or
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promising practices (Singleton et al., 2014). It can provide an appropriate level of
needed insight into disaster response successes and challenges (Norige et al., 2012;
Singleton et al., 2014). Identifying deficit-based factors will identify changes to be
made to prevent the recurrence of problems that were already highlighted (Singleton
et al., 2014). Changes will involve corrective actions that contain sufficient detail to
be implemented and must be intended to correct the root cause of the issue (Rooney
& Heuvel, 2004; Singleton et al., 2014). The HSEEP guidelines involve continuous
improvement system through the effective implementation of corrective actions
(Norige et al., 2012; Singleton et al., 2014). The corrective actions should be specific
in containing enough useful information to clearly state what steps should be taken
to effectively address the issue (Singleton et al., 2014; Szoenyi et al., 2017). By
including the reason, purpose, or benefit of implementing the corrective actions,
improvement recommendations must clearly indicate measurable key performance
indicators to gauge progress toward full implementation (Norige et al., 2012;
Percarpio et al., 2008; Rooney & Heuvel, 2004; Singleton et al., 2014; Woodward,
2004). AARs that include RCA, as well as corrective actions associated with quality
improvement of capabilities will increase the effectiveness in the emergency
preparedness efforts.
The aim of this project is to contribute to the maximization of knowledge
management and quality improvement practices in hospitals emergency response
efforts. Therefore, we have endeavored to analyze improvement plans in order to
identify common challenges from real events disasters and emergency preparedness
and response exercises. Our study has attempted to describe how hospitals can
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mitigate these issues, by suggesting that recurring response challenges are integrated
into the design of future emergency operations planning.
3. Methodology
i. Sample population:
Improvement plans will be collected from a convenience sample of
approximately 30-50 hospitals, which are actives members of the Association of
Healthcare Emergency Preparedness Professionals (AHEPP). The AHEPP was formed
in 2014 to provide healthcare preparedness professionals with the best range of
strategic, educational, operational, networking, and planning resources. The requests
to participate in the study were sent to hospitals with no regards to their size and
specialties. The assumption was made that the sample was a representative of the full
scope of threats as requests were randomly sent to hospitals that participated to the
AHEPP Annual Conference in 2017. We preferred to address hospitals that were
members of the AHEPP as we could experience some reticence from hospitals in
sharing their confidential documents.
ii. Data collection methods
We sent a web link to 114 AHEPP’s members to request their participation in
our study and five hospitals responded favorably. We had a rate of participation of
4.38% of hospitals of size ranging from large to small. AARs were received and deidentified by the AHEPP before sending them to the research team.
Although secondary data were used, our design was based on case study
research design by which data will be systematically collected and coded in order to
facilitate connection to underlying principles. Based on the request from AHEPP
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leadership, hospitals will have a period of two weeks to share their improvement
matrix by e-mail. Data received from hospitals will be redacted and will not contain
any identifiers. IRB will not be required given this study is preliminary needs
assessment as being part of a quality improvement project for AHEPP.
iii. Study data
The study will involve both real-incidents and emergency response exercises
reports. The AARs are written in narrative form; thus, the qualitative approach will
be used to analyze the content of the improvement plan. Twenty-three reports have
been received and all of them will be included in the study.
iv. Data analysis
1. Statistical analysis
An integration of both top down and bottom-up qualitative analysis method
were used in our study. Improvement matrix received from hospitals were entered
into MAXQDA for analysis. MAXQDA version 12 and produced by VERBI GmbH is a
software program designed for computer-assisted qualitative and mixed methods
data, text and multimedia analysis in academic, scientific, and business institutions.
We aimed to perform a content analysis of IPs included in twenty-three AARs. AARs
were categorized based on types of incidents and the six Joint Commission critical
areas were used to identify the hospital capabilities that are being tested. IPs’ content
analysis was performed according to thirty-four critical areas ‘elements of
performance which were retrieved from the Joint Commission hospital accreditation
standards.
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Each Improvement Plan is reviewed and coded, and notes were taken in order
to categorize the reports into types of incidents. Coded segments were assigned to
relevant elements of performance which were sub-coded to the critical areas.
MAXQDA will be used to abstract data based on types of event, capability being
evaluated, and improvement areas. Descriptive statistics were performed to identify
the recurrence of the themes and their frequencies were tabulated from each
elements of performance. The first step of our analysis involved the description of
differences across types of incidents. Then, we have described variations in
capabilities and their corresponding elements of performance.
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4. Results
Table 1. The Occurrence of Improvement Areas Per Critical Areas and Types of Incident.

Improvement Areas Occurrences Per Threat Category
Threat Category

Resources and
Assets

Communication System failure

0

Patient clinical
and support
activities
0

Natural disasters

14

Child abduction

Utilities
management

Staff

Safety and
security

0

10

0

8

18

12

2

25

18

24

95

0

0

0

3

3

6

12

Real Event- Road Accident

4

9

0

13

4

4

34

Utility Failure

4

2

4

2

5

4

21

Facility Evacuation

7

12

2

31

14

24

90

Active Shooter

2

0

0

12

14

12

40

Hazardous Materials

12

5

2

23

10

13

65

Code Bleu: Cardiac or Respiratory arrest

10

2

0

11

1

6

30

Code Red: Fire or Smoke

2

3

3

16

20

29

73

Total
Percentage (%)

55

45

13

146

89

130

478

11.5

9.4

2.7

30.5

18.6

Communication Total

Percentage
(%)

3.8
19.9
2.5
7.1
4.4
18.8
8.4
13.6
6.3
15.3

27.2
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Twenty-three AARs were received from hospitals and all of them were included
in our study. AARs included in the study had variable volume of information (at least
one statement) that were sufficient for the content analysis of hospital emergency
preparedness critical areas. Ten types of incidents were identified based on the
exercise overview and the real events mentioned in AARs. Of the twenty-three ARRs,
two focused on the response to communication failure, four focused on response to
natural disasters, one focused on the response to child abduction, two focused on
response to utility failure, three focuses on response to facility evacuation, two
focused on response to active shooters, five focused on response to hazardous
materials, one focused on response to code blue emergency, two focused on response
to code red emergency, and one real event road accident. All ARRs involved
improvement plans that focused on at least one of the six Joint Commission
accreditation critical areas.
All six critical areas and their element of performance were coded according to
the improvement plan of each AAR/IP. The number of occurrences of critical areas is
shown in table 1. A total number of 478 occurrences of element of performances were
coded from the twenty-three AARs, with staff (30.5%) and communication (27.2%)
having the highest element of performance. Utility management (2.7%) had the
lowest area of improvement as a result of the exercises or real event reports. The
element of performances per threat categories has shown higher occurrences during
natural disasters (19.8%) and facility evacuations (18.8%). Lower occurrences were
observed during code red (15.2%), hazardous materials (13.5%), active shooter
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(8.3%), road accident (7.1%), code blue (6.2%), utility failure (4.3%), communication
system failure (3.7%), and child abduction (2.5%) (see details in table 1).
i.

Staff

Of the twenty-three AARs describing challenges associated with the capability of staff
responsibilities, we were able to extrapolate one-hundred-forty-six different
statements. Top three types of incident with improvement areas related to staff
involved: facility evacuation (21.2%); natural disasters (17.1%); and hazardous
materials (15.7%). The content analysis was done based on elements of performance
that were derived from staff capability as shown in table 2.
Table 2: Staff Elements of Performance with some of their corresponding improvement areas
Staff primary and
cross-trained roles
and responsibilities

▪

▪

▪

The Business
Continuity Plan
(BCP) was not
timely received,
even though
command
implemented a
deadline;
Staff were
unfamiliar with
hospital
incident
command
system
practices,
incident
response
guides, and job
action sheets;

How staff are
assigned to all
essential functions

▪

Confusion on
appointing
roles and what
exactly that role
entailed;

▪

There wasn’t
trained public
information
officer available
is the response
team;

▪

There was not
enough staff to
effectively
search for the
missing child.

How the emergency
operation plan
describes how to
identify licensed
independent
practitioners, staff,
and authorized
volunteers
▪ The hospital
needed more
staff at the
entrance
throughout the
time we were
diverting
patients;
▪

Needed
someone
designated as
the family care
unit leader;

▪

Needed a
liaison between
the nursing and
imaging
department.

How hospital
identifies individual
(s) to whom staff
report in the incident
command structure

▪

Staff were not
clear on
whether to
report to the
Incident
Command
Commander or
not;

▪

Communications
unit leader
wasn't sure who
to call;

▪

some patient
care sections
operated
independently
of the chief of
operations.

Some staff were
not well trained
on the
utilization of
specialized
medical
equipment.
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ii. Communication
Challenges associated with communication have been extrapolated hundredthirty times and it was across the ten types of incident. Most communication issues
were observed during code red emergencies (22.3%), facility evacuations (18.4%),
and natural disasters (18.4%). Elements of performance from the communication
capabilities were used to extrapolate areas of improvement from AARs as shown in
table 3.
Table 3: Communication Elements of Performance with some of their corresponding improvement
areas
How an employee will
be notified that the
emergency response
procedures have been
initiated.
▪

Not all leaders
were notified of
the event;

▪

Staff were
unable to access
the hospital
emergency
preparedness
portal for
corporate
notification of
exercise;

▪

How the hospital will
communicate with the
patient and their
families.
▪

▪

Administrators
On Call (AOC)
were not
included in the
code pink
emergency
paging group.
▪

There was no
communication
when a patient
was dropped off
in the front
lobby;
there was lack
of verbal call
outs and closedloop
communication,
and families and
friends were
not notified of
the new
location that the
patient was
relocated to
within the
hospital;
The
communication
plan did not
consider
external
services

Demonstrate
successful use of
internal and external
radios sending and
receiving
transmissions.
▪ Radios were
requested for
the command
center but were
not utilized;
▪

Not all
information
went through
the chain of
command;

▪

Security and
plant
operations were
not able to
communicate
with each other
because
security went
on digital radios
while plant
operations still
using analog
ones.

Backup systems for
communications and
downtime
documentation
procedures
▪

Limited landline
phones
available;

▪

Public Switched
Telephone
Network
(PSTN) devices
were kept in
cabinets;

▪

Hospital
electronic
incident
command
system was
having
intermittent
problems.
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iii. Safety and Security
Safety and security capabilities were coded with eighty-nine statements that
involved all AARs. Most safety and security issues were extrapolated from code red
emergencies (23.4%), natural disasters (20.2%), facility evacuation (15.7%), and
active shooter (15.7%). The remaining types of incident mentioned few improvement
areas regarding safety and security. For example, communication system failure
reported zero improvement area and one segment was extrapolated from code blue
emergencies. We extrapolated the statements from the AARs and coded them with
different elements of performance as shown in table 4.
Table 4: Safety and Security Elements of Performance with some of their corresponding
improvement areas

How hospital will
coordinate security
activities internally
and with community
security agencies.
▪ Security staff
were present in
the command
center, but not
utilized
sufficiently;
▪

There was not
enough security
staff to
effectively
search for the
missing child;

How to restrict facility
access and control
movement of an
unauthorized person.
▪

Security staff
did not have
proxy badges to
access certain
areas of the
hospital;

▪

Some
hazardous
materials spill
procedures
were found not
up to date;

▪

Unnecessary
personnel and
visitors in close
proximity to
scenes;

▪

No safety and
security staff
were present
for the drill;

▪
▪

▪

Some video
surveillance
cameras were
not working
during the
power outages.

How the hospital will
manage hazardous
materials.

Not all
employees were
wearing their
identification
badges.

Handling
hazardous
materials was
not performed
appropriately

Demonstrate a chain
of custody for
personal belonging.
▪

Patient
evacuation was
delayed due to
poor handling
of their
personal
belongings;

▪

Patient care
devise batteries
were
overcharged
and heated up
during power
outage;

▪

Upon initial
patient
movement, it
was unclear as
to what
entrance was
being used by
the vans to
transport
patients.
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iv. Resources and Assets
Resources and Assets were coded, and fifty-five statements were extrapolated
from AARs. Natural disasters (25.4%), hazardous materials (21.8%), and code blue
(18.1%) had the highest coded segments. Improvement areas were extrapolated
based on their relation to the elements of performance of the capabilities.
Table 5: Resources and Assets Elements of Performance with some of their corresponding
improvement areas

How the hospital will
monitor quantities of
its resources and
assets during an
emergency.
▪ All evacuations
regardless of
the department
generating
evacuees had to
go through the
ICS system as
they all
compete for the
same resources;
▪

Some of the
inventory forms
came back
incomplete;

▪

Patients rooms
were not ready
to
accommodate
pediatric
treatments.

How hospitals will
obtain and replenish
medications.
▪

▪

▪

Some hospital's
departments
did not have
medications
and supplies
when
requested;
Having patients
all the way
down the hall
was a struggle
bringing
medications
and supplies
down to the
point of
operations;
Some
department did
not have
pediatric chest
tubes.

How the hospital
arranges
transportation of
patient.

How to conserve and
share resources with
other health care
organization

▪

There was no
plan for full
evacuation of
hospital;

▪

Equipment such
the suction unit
was nonfunctional;

▪

There were not
enough vehicles
to evacuate staff
as not all them
drive to work;

▪

There was not a
specific EOP for
dialysis.

▪

There was no
separate
location
designated to
set up
Emergency
Management
Services
transport, and
patients who
were
discharged.
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v. Patient clinical and support activities
Patient clinical and support activities are one major capability that has been
extensively evaluated by hospitals and it we have extrapolated statements from AARs
forty-five times. Segments from AARs involved various types of incidents and the
highest are as follow: Natural disasters (26.6%), facility evacuations (26.6), and road
accident (20%). Exercises for active shooter did not mention improvement areas
related to patient clinical and support activities. Elements of performance related to
patient clinical and support activities were coded by relevant improvement areas
segments as shown in table 6.
Table 6: Patient clinical and support activities Elements of Performance with some of their
corresponding improvement areas
How the hospital will manage
patient scheduling, triage,
assessment, and treatment.
▪

No plan was made for
alternate triage or
treatment sites;

▪

there was no plan for
alternative blood courier
service to provide blood
to the point of treatment;

How patient documentation
and tracking capabilities
during emergency.
▪

No use of the disaster kits
and patient charts;

▪

The tracking forms that
were available for the
exercise were not used
during the event;

▪
▪

There was a delay in
providing food to the
patients.

There wasn't appropriate
internal and external
patient tracking system,
and there was delay
accessing patient chart.

How hospital demonstrated
horizontal and vertical patient
evacuation using equipment,
routes, and location of staging
areas.
▪ Improvement areas
involved the fact that not
all evacuation tags were
filled out;
▪

The specialty clinic did
not appropriately use the
wheelchair stair machine
to vertically move
patients;

▪

Staff who were assisting
in the relocation of
patients were not made
aware of any medical
precautions.
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vi. Utilities management
The capability for utility management resulted in thirteen coded segments and
utility failure (30.7%) had the biggest number of improvement areas. As mentioned
in table 7, various elements of performance were coded based on improvement areas
from AARs.
Table 7: Utilities management Elements of Performance with some of their corresponding
improvement areas

Availability of water, electricity, and HVAC.
▪

Gas line rupture was not
timely addressed;

▪

▪

▪

▪

Fire in kitchen caused by
electricity was not timely
addressed;

Multiple medication
administration machines
were usable during the
power outage;

staff were not sure what
to do with the blood and
regents during power
outage;

▪

▪

Loss of power and nonfunctional back-up
generator were not
properly addressed;

The Complete blood
count (CBC) machine in
the laboratory shut down
due to heat;

Dryer that was on fire did
not have hightemperature sensors;

▪
▪

Computed Tomography
(CT) and Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI)
were unable to be used
during power outage due
to heat sensitivity;

Double doors well closed
and that limited the
ventilation efforts.

5. Discussion
AARs are knowledge management tools that can be used to identify, describe, and
disseminate the insight and experiences gained by individuals and groups during a
challenging event (Savoia et al., 2012) The analysis of AARs comprises an opportunity
to identify common and/or recurring systems-level challenges. Recurring themes
across different types of incidents and across multiple types of systems may present
a direct mandate for hospitals to address the areas of improvement. The goal is to
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create a requirement to test the areas of improvement in exercises to ensure that the
corrective actions were successful. Therefore, improvement areas should be directly
addressed by emergency operations planners, and tested through the interactive
cycle of planning, testing, measuring and improving, as recommended in the FEMA
guidance for the development of AARs/IPs (Savoia et al., 2012). Our study analyzed
twenty-three AARs and improvement areas grouped according to the six Joint
Commission critical areas of emergency response. Most common improvement areas
were related to staff roles and responsibilities, and communication. We were
unexpectedly surprised by the fact that staff roles and responsibility was the highest
capability

that

needed

improvement.

Most

literatures

have

mentioned

communication to be challenging during emergency response as multiple responders
coordinate their efforts. Therefore, we expected communication capability to involve
more improvement areas.
The analysis of results related to staff revealed that most AARs have highlighted
difficulties related to confusion in roles and responsibilities among various response
personnel, and staff demonstrating a poor depth of knowledge of individual response
roles. Ambiguity regarding role and responsibilities, and lack of use of the ICS were
due to lack of training among responders. At various points of operation, additional
staff was needed. Additional staff could have been mobilized from the labor pool.
In terms of how the hospital communicates with staff, patients, and external
systems, the most frequent issues were related to the ability to process and release
new information, which was often reported as not timely and not reaching all
stakeholders. Therefore, we suggested the need to develop pre-approved messages
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to increase the timely release of information. Communication tracking was a
challenge during code red, facility evacuations, and natural disasters with cases
ranging from the redundancy of information to absolute lack of information. During
the response to natural disasters, code red, and power outage, the damages to
communication infrastructures such as radio and wireless communications systems
may be the cause of major communication difficulties. Communication across
different teams within the same hospital was a major issue due to a lack of clarity
between routine activities and emergency operations. A recommendation would be
to train more people to send out messages during emergency events using
appropriate communication methods.
Our study has identified a number of common themes of “lessons learned” that we
were able to retrieve from the AARs collected from hospitals. We believe that the
common themes identified in our study provide data in support of current emergency
preparedness and response initiatives. Our goal of the study is to provide substantial
information on potential issues related to emergency response in hospitals. Instead
of relying on complex training programs such as the multi-year training and exercise
program (MYTEP) recommended by the HSEEP, local and state exercise planners can
take advantage of simple summaries of the most common response challenges that
have routinely proved to be problematic. Therefore, such data could be used by
planners when drafting their MYTEP in order to proactively mitigate challenges
during real events or exercises.
As recommended by the HSEEP guidelines, some AARs were designed to include
improvement areas to address the problems they encountered. However, many of the
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recommendations for improvement were often rather generic and could not be
converted into concrete corrective actions. For example, one hospital reported the
need to “create a communication plan” but was unable to describe the requirements
that the plan would entail. Many other hospitals argued that “the planning section
needed to fill additional positions to assist with the amount of information that needed
to be evaluated and processed” leaving ambiguity about which specific additional
positions were needed. Many improvement areas were lacking specific examples to
clearly illustrate what went wrong. Further, the lack of a consistent structure in AARs
creates more challenge in the identification of root causes of problems. Therefore, it
would be difficult to identify specific problems in order to aggregate the lessons
learned.
We suggest that recommendations for improvement provide more detailed
response challenges, and extensively use root cause analysis methodology to better
understand the sources of the problems. A hospital should use a consistent and simple
structure to identify emergency response challenges to its ability to apply lessons
learned. The HSEEP and the Joint Commission should work together to reinforce the
use of consistent AARs/IPs template across all hospitals in the US. Further, hospitals
should be encouraged to test the emergency response capabilities described by the
Joint Commission accreditation standards to facilitate consistent reporting
mechanism for all types of incidents. That will avoid confusion regarding the
competing, conflicting, and evolving federal capabilities lists. AAR data should be
used by regulatory services for accountability purposes and to provide feedback to
hospitals. Government may consider providing financial incentives that encourage
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meeting certain quality criteria in conducting exercises and producing IPs. Quality
criteria could involve the use of standard capabilities frameworks, root cause
analysis, concrete examples to illustrate response challenges, and result testing
mechanisms to ensure effective implementation.
We believe that the use of consistent structure and including the definition of
acronyms in AARs will facilitate the identification of problems that may be common
to several hospitals. Therefore, urgent needs can be immediately addressed, and
corrective actions can be proactively included in regional training and exercise
programs. Emergency preparedness and response planners would have the
opportunity to access best practice central repositories to facilitate the identification
of common response challenges. Therefore, hospitals will have greater potential for
learning from each other, and other healthcare organizations can benefit from IPs that
were well produced and submitted to the central repositories.
i.

Limitations/Delimitations of the study

Major limitation of the study is the reluctance of hospital to share information due
to their fierce competition. A limitation of our study involved the fact that we had
incomplete information as only the improvement matrices were requested from
hospitals. Understanding the improvement matrices were challenging as they did not
contain information regarding the overview of the exercise and the analysis of core
capabilities. It was noted during the AARs analysis that there was no consistency on
what was included in each critical area section, on how the critical areas were named
or defined, or on the improvement areas. Furthermore, it was difficult to understand
acronyms that were extensively used in the improvement matrices. Due to staff
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turnover and the use of independent practitioners or volunteers, AARs should be
written in the most clear way. We delimitated our study not to compare emergency
response efforts between hospitals as our focus was more directed towards
identifying common improvement areas. Also, we did not focus on the format of AARs
as we did not receive full documents from some hospitals.
6. Conclusions
Knowledge management is an important discipline which involves the use of
various strategies and practices to identify, define and disseminate insights and
experiences gained over time (Savoia et al., 2012). A platform such as the Lessons
Learned Information Sharing program and the AHEPP are available resources that
could be used by hospitals to improve their emergency preparedness and response
operations. Our systematic analysis of AARs enabled us to identify common
challenges that have consistently emerged during emergency events or exercises
related to different types of disasters from a small sample of U.S. hospitals. These
improvement areas involve issues that should be avoided in future emergency
responses. Training and educations could focus on common improvement areas in
order to achieve best value for the use of their resources. We believe that the outcome
of our study could be a basis for a future widespread data-driven support system for
identifying key areas of concerns to be mitigated during the emergency response
planning process. Further, we believe that future exercises could include these
challenges in their objectives as a mechanism for ensuring that emergency response
efforts are successful. Future studies could involve larger comparisons of hospitals or
the evaluation of the implementation of corrective actions within the same
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organization in order to create a collective learning platform from which the entire
country can learn from.
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Annexes 1

Improvement Areas Occurrences Per Threat Category
Patient clinical
Resources and
Utilities
Threat Category
and support
Assets
management
activities
Communication System failure
0
0
0

Safety and
Percentage
Communication Total
security
(%)

Staff
10

0

8

18

Natural disasters

14

12

2

25

18

24

95

Child abduction

0

0

0

3

3

6

12

Real Event- Road Accident

4

9

0

13

4

4

34

Utility Failure

4

2

4

2

5

4

21

Facility Evacuation

7

12

2

31

14

24

90

Active Shooter

2

0

0

12

14

12

40

Hazardous Materials

12

5

2

23

10

13

65

Code Bleu: Cardiac or Respiratory arrest

10

2

0

11

1

6

30

Code Red: Fire or Smoke

2

3

3

16

20

29

73

Total
Percentage (%)

55

45

13

146

89

130

478

11.5

9.4

2.7

30.5

18.6

27.2
42

3.8
19.9
2.5
7.1
4.4
18.8
8.4
13.6
6.3
15.3

Annexes 2

Number of Coded Segment Per Document
Document group

3/25/2019 10:30:47

Number of coded
segments
48

3/25/2019 10:30:48

30

0

AdilyAbdoulaye

3/25/2019 10:30:49
3/25/2019 10:30:49
3/25/2019 10:30:49
3/25/2019 10:30:49

4
17
24
34

0
0
0
0

AdilyAbdoulaye
AdilyAbdoulaye
AdilyAbdoulaye
AdilyAbdoulaye

3/25/2019 10:30:49
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4
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0
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0
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Submission 11 Code red: fire or smoke in the hospital 3/25/2019 10:30:48
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0
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4
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45

0
0
0
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0
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0
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Document name

Code Red: Fire or Smoke

Submission 1 Code red: fire or smoke in the hospital
Submission 10 Code blue: cardiac or respiratory
Code Bleu: Cardiac or Respiratory arrest
arrest
Communication System faillure
Submission 13 Fiber Optic Line Cut
Hazardous Materials
Submission 15 Hazmat Incident Full Scale Exercise
Active Shooter
Submission 16 Active Shooter Full Scale Exercise
Real Event- Road Accident
Submission 18 Real Event Bus accident
Submission 19 Tornado/Hazardous Materials Table
Natural disasters
Top Exercise
Child abduction
Submission 20 child abduction
Utility Faillure
Submission 22 power outage
Facility Evacuation
Submission 23 Evacuation
Communication System faillure
Submission 3 IT system Faillure
Submission 5 Utility Failure resulting in RO
Utility Faillure
treatment system s
Active Shooter
Submission 8 Active Shooter
Code Red: Fire or Smoke
Hazardous Materials
Natural disasters
Facility Evacuation
Facility Evacuation
Hazardous Materials
Natural disasters
Natural disasters
Hazardous Materials
Hazardous Materials

Submission 12 Medical gas Leak
Submission 14 Simulation Drill
Submission 17 Evacuation Full-Scale Exercise
Submission 2 Facility Evacuation and Closure
Functional Exercis
Submission 9 Hazardous Materials exposure
Submission 21 earthquakes
Submission 6 F5 Tornado
Submission 7 Air Quality Incident - Hazardous
Materials exposur
Submission 4 Airborne threat to the healthcare
facility

Creation date

Number of memos

Author

0
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